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CLASSIFICATION

DATE 15 June 1954

TO PBSUCCESS Headquarters

INFO: Guatemala

FROM LINCOLN

SUBJECT GENERAL K-Program
SPECIFIC Plant of a Newspaper Story on High Command Rift

1. The attached draft of a newspaper story is designed to widen the existing rift within the Army High Command, building up SANCHEZ at the expense of his chief rival and enemy Colonel DIAZ. It furthermore is meant to serve as conveying to SANCHEZ a message which is self-explanatory. In line with deas on the subject, we propose to go along with his supposition that SANCHEZ may be controllable once it has been brought home to him that ARBENZ cause is lost. In fact, it may be possible to develop through him a control relationship over important elements of the top echelon of the Army who are believed to be hostile toward CALLIGERIS, but who can be expected to do SANCHEZ bidding. Certain prerequisites will have to be fulfilled before SANCHEZ will see the light. This aspect has been fully covered in recent progress reports.

ر ر) WDP/GLP/eaf 15 June 1954

Attachment Distribution

- 2 Washington
- 2 Guatemala
- 3 IINCOIN

WILLIAM D. PLAYDON

SECRET/RYBAT/PBSUCCESS

Addendum to HUL-A-1000 15 June 1954

Since signing the foregoing, the following thoughts have occurred to me.

- A. I would suggest any such help as you can get from the Acting Chief and Deputy Chief of KUBARK staff as well as the press group working with that staff. As you may know, they have developed pretty extensive connections with the press in this country and can also make use of the facilities of John BEGG's office in USIA. It would not hurt to mention BEGG specifically to them.
- B. The attached proposed news article is a meaty one and would have, we believe, a very useful effect if published. Consequently please push for the earliest possible publication and, if successful, let LINCOLN know by cable where, when and how published. We can then pick it up for further distribution through such media as SHERWOOD.
- C. Please do everything possible to have it used in its present form since it was prepared carefully for certain planned effects which could easily be lost if changed by someone not fully aware of the background.

[_____] W.D.P.

WDP/gfb 15 June 1954 Although it would be difficult to sustain a forecast of events of a startling nature, a pall of foreboding and fear hangs over this country and invests the higher reaches of the Government. For the first time since President Arbenz took office, the Guatemalan Army High Command seems to be taking a more active interest in developments liable to affect Guatemala's military and international posture; refusing to accept the Government's optimistic estimates of the situation at face value, it tries, with all the customary precautions enforced by the vigilance of a ubiquitous and ruthless communist-controlled police system, to elicit authoritative American views on the nature and extent of remedial action considered indispensable in order to break the communist stranglehold on Guatemala.

Your correspondent has learned from usually well-informed sources that
Army officers about whose abiding loyalty to President Arbenz there can be no
doubt, are profoundly shocked at realizing the full extent to which the Arbenz
regime has alienated Guatemala's closest and most powerful friend, the United
States of America. They conclude that the United States is firmly resolved to
protect her national security by meeting head-on the communist challenge presented
by Arbenz and his regime, even if this should entail a temporary shelving of good
neighbor policy. An added shock has been provided by the conspicuous failure of
the Guatemalan Government's transparent efforts to gain a breathing spell by lulling
her neighbors and the United States into a false sense of complacency.

It can be stated for a fact that the Army High Command, casting about for an expedient to stave off national disaster, has found the time-honored escape hatch of a palace coup temporarily blocked. President Arbenz' choice as

Guatemala's next President is the Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Diaz.

He is generally considered an obedient tool of the Communist Party of Guatemala.

Not only would he be clearly unacceptable to Guatemala's neighbors and to the United States, but—in words of a ranking Guatemalan field commander and close personal friend of President Arbenz—his choice would by the majority of the Guatemalan officers' corps be considered "an affront to the national dignity of Guatemala."

Another aspirant for the Presidency, who no longer enjoys President
Arbenz' backing, is the Minister of National Defense, Colonel Sanchez. He is
not pro-communist and has a strong following among some of the best elements
of Guatemala's officers' corps. Thus far he has failed to provide the kind of
forceful and constructive leadership which, by virtue of his personal and
professional prestige, he could be expected to exercise. Like many of his
fellow officers he is waiting for tangible demonstrations of the effective
strength of the Guatemalan opposition and for more conclusive indications of
United States backing. He and other officers of his ilk fail to understand that
time is of the essence, if an attempt is to be made to resolve Guatemala's
communist problem in a manner leaving the integrity of the Armed Forces unimpaired.